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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS "MEGAN'S LAW"?
A recent headline in the Baton Rouge Advocate read: "Supreme Court
upholds Megan's Law sex offender ruling." The article went on to recount the
recent the United States' Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a case
challenging the validity of "Megan's Law," a law that requires sex offenders to
Copyright 1998, by LOUISiANA LAW REVIEW.
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register with police and to notify their neighbors of the crime in which they were
convicted.' The lower court's ruling upheld the constitutional validity of the law,
specifically holding that the requirements could apply retroactively without
violating the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. While Louisiana's highest
court has yet to speak on this specific issue, the rule in Louisiana is that, in some
cases, retroactive application of our version of "Megan's Law" does violate ex
post facto principles. This comment will attempt to reconcile these differing
results by showing that Louisiana courts may have misconstrued the relationship
between "Megan's Law" and the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and, in
effect, are restricting our law unnecessarily.
State legislatures across the country began to enact statutes requiring sex
offender registration and notification in the early 1990's. This followed several
highly publicized cases of serial sex offenders who, once released from prison,
subsequently committed another violent crime.' The intense media coverage of
these incidents created a wave of public pressure, forcing legislators to face the
issue of recidivism among sex offenders, and the ensuing congressional
investigations uncovered studies that contained alarming results.' Not only were
sex offenders more likely to repeat their crimes then other criminals, but
evidence also indicated that treatment of these offenders was often ineffective.4
I. Richard Carelli, Supreme Court upholds Megan's Law sex offender ruling, The Advocate,
Feb. 24, 1998, at 14A.
2. One of the most well known cases was the rape and murder of seven-year old Megan
Kanka. On July 29, 1994, Megan was savagely raped and murdered by her neighbor. Both the
residents of her small Trenton suburb and communities all across the country were angered when it
was discovered that Megan's murderer, 33-year old Jessec Timmendequas, had already served six
years in prison for aggravated assault and attempted sexual assault of a child. James Popkin et al.,
Natural Born Predators, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 19, 1994, at 64. See also Claire M.
Kimball, Note & Comment, A Modern Day Arthur Dimmesdale: Public Notification when Sex
Offenders are Released Into the Community, 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1187, 1188 (1996).
3. In New Jersey, over 200,000 citizens signed a petition "demanding that government
officials notify communities when sex offenders move into the neighborhood." Sarah Glazer,
Punishing Sex Offenders, CQ Researcher, January 12, 1996, at 27.
4. "Studies report that rapists recidivate at a rate of 7 to 35%; offenders who molest young
girls, at a rate of 10 to 29%, and offenders who molest young boys, at a rate of 13 to 40%. Further,
of those who recidivate, many commit their second crime after a long interval without offense. In
cases of sex offenders, as compared to other criminals, the propensity to commit crimes does not
decrease over time .... [i]n one study, 48% of the recidivist sex offenders repeated during the first
five years and 52% during the next 17 years." Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 374 (N.J. 1995).
However, the statistics on recidivism rates are inconsistent. While some studies show recidivism
rates as low as 20%, other studies estimate the recidivism rate at up to 80%. See Diane Brady,
Radical Treatment: A Special Program In Manitoba Seeks to Put Sex Offenders Back in Society,
Maclean's, April 26, 1993, at 38 and Robert E. Freeman-Longo and Ronald V. Wall, Changing a
Lifetime of Sexual Crime: Can Sex Offenders Ever Alter Their Ways? Special Treatment Programs
Provide Some Hope, Psychology Today, March 1986, at 58. Some other studies find that the
recidivism rate for sex offenders is no greater than the rates for other criminals. Mary Anne Kircher.
Note, Registration of Sexual Offenders: Would Washington 's Scarlet Letter Approach Benefit
Minnesota?, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 163, 164 (1992). It appears that no true rate of
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In response to these findings, state lawmakers around the nation began to enact
"sex offender registration and notification provisions."'
Although the detailed requirements of the statutes differ from state to state,
registration laws generally require convicted sex offenders to provide local law
enforcement officials with photographs, fingerprints, and personal information
such as home and work addresses." Notification statutes take this one step
further, requiring offenders to provide their neighbors with their name, address
and conviction record.' Together, these statutes have become known as
"Megan's Law," named for Megan Kanka, whose tragic death was the catalyst
for gathering public sentiment behind these enactments.' Today, forty-seven
states have sex offender registration requirements, and twenty states provide for
community notification.9 Moreover, the force of the movement is so great that
recidivism can accurately be determined because the risk of reoffense depends on a number of
factors. These factors including the kind of offense committed, what is considered a reoffense, and
whether or not the offender-received treatment.
5. Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community Notification And The Constitution, 29
Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 117, 118 (1995).
6. E.g., New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:7-8 requires all persons who complete a sentence
for certain designated crimes involving sexual assault to register with local law enforcement if their
conduct is "characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior." The registrant must
provide the following information to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which
he resides: name, social security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye
color, address of legal residence, address of any current temporary legal residence, and date and place
of employment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-4b(l) (West 1995). The registration agency then forwards
the registrant's information, as well as any additional information it may have, to the prosecutor of
the county that prosecuted the registrant. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-4c to d (West 1995). The
prosecutor, in turn, forwards the information to the Division of State Police, which incorporates it
into a central registry and notifies the prosecutor of the county in which the registrant plans to reside.
This information is available to law enforcement agencies of New Jersey, other states, and the United
States. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-5 (West 1995). The registration information is not open to public
inspection. Law enforcement agencies are authorized to release "relevant and necessary information
regarding sex offenses to the public when ... necessary for public protection," but only in
accordance with the notification procedures we describe below. Failure of the sex offender to
comply with registration is a fourth-degree crime. Doe, 662 A.2d 380. See also Note, Prevention
Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1711, 1713 (1996) [hereinafter Prevention).
7. The goal of notification is simple, to make people aware that violent sex offenders may be
living in their neighborhood so that families can take the precautions they deem necessary to protect
themselves. Elga A. Goodman, Megan s Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court Navigates Uncharted
Waters, 26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 764, 771 (1996).
8. See Ryan A. Boland, Comment, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification:
Protection, Not Punishment, 30 New Eng. L. Rev. 183 (1995) ("Three months after the body of
Megan Kanka was found, the governor of New Jersey, Christine Todd Whitman, signed one of the
most comprehensive and stringent sex offender bills into law."). See also Christine M. Kong, The
Neighbors are Watching: Targeting Sexual Predators with Notification Laws, 40 Vill. L. Rev. 1257,
1258 (1996).
9. Prevention, supra note 6, at 1713. Most states have adopted sex-offender registration
statutes. Ala. Code § 13A-1 1-200 (1994); Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010 (1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 13-3821 (1981 & Supp. 1997), 41-1750(B) (1995 & Supp. 1997); Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-901
1998]
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Congress recently enacted federal legislation in an effort to provide additional
protection from repeat sex offenders.'
Louisiana has also joined the effort with three interrelated provisions
(hereinafter "Louisiana's Megan's Law")." Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:540-
549 are the general provisions and affect any person convicted of an enumerated
sex offense. 2 Also, the legislature passed Act No 962 amending both Article
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1995); Cal. Penal Code § 290 to 290.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-412.5 (West Supp. 1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-102r (Supp. 1997); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. ch. 775.21 (Supp. 1998); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 42-9- 44.1 (1997); Idaho Code §§ 18-8301 to 8311 (1997); III. Rev. Stat. ch. 730, para. 150/I
(1997); Ind. Code § 5-2-12-1 to 12 (Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4902 to 4909 (1995 & Supp.
1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17.510 (Baldwin 1995); La. R.S. 15:540-549 (Supp. 1998); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. it. 34-A, §§ 11003, 11004 (West Supp. 1997); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 22C, § 37
(1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.731 (West Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (Supp. 1998);
Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-1 (Supp. 1997); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.600 (Supp. 1998); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 46-23-501 to 507 (1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 179A.180 to .240 (1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-
A:12 (1996); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.01 (1997
& Supp. 1998); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 581 to 587 (1991 & Supp. 1998); Or. Rev. Stat. §§
181.508, 181.518 (1991); R.. Gen. Laws § 11-37-16 (1994); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-3400
(Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-101 to 108 (1997); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 62.01 to .12
(West 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-21.5 (1995 & Supp. 1997); Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-298.1 to
3, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 9A.44.130, 4.24.550 (Supp.
1998); W.Va. Code § 61-8F-i to 8 (1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 301.45 (Supp. 1997); Wyo. Stat. §
7-19-301 (1995). Of these, the following states provide, in their statutes, some form of community
notification; Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.
10. The Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, signed into law by
President Clinton on September 13, 1994, requires states to set up programs to protect against violent
sex offenders. The Act requires released sex offenders and those who commit crimes against children
to register with the local police and notify the authorities of any change of address. Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103- 322, 108 Stat. 1796, 203842 (1994)
(available in 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West Supp. 1998)).
11. La. R.S. 15: 542-549 (Supp. 1998); La. R.S. 15:574.4 (Supp. 1998); La. Code Crim. P. art.
895(H). Although there are three statutes that encompass Louisiana's version of Megan's Law, this
comment will use the singular tense when referring to them collectively. When reference is made
to a specific statute, its designation will be used.
12. Sub-section E of Section 542 states that "'Sex offense' for the purpose of this Chapter
means conviction for the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any provision of R.S. 14:92(A)(7),
of Subpart C of Part 11, Subpart B of Part IV, or Subpart A([) or A(4) of Part V, of Chapter I of
Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, committed on or after June 18, 1992, or
committed prior to June 18, 1992 if the person, as a result of the offense, is under the custody of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections on or after June 18, 1992. A conviction for any offense
provided in this definition includes a conviction for the offense under the laws of another state which
is' equivalent to an offense provided for in this Chapter." Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:92(A)(7) is
contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile "by performing any sexually immoral act." Subpart C
of Part I is Rape and Sexual Battery. Subpart B of Part IV includes criminal bigamy and incest.
Subparts A(I) of Part V includes carnal knowledge of a juvenile, indecent behavior with juveniles,
pornography involving juveniles, and molestation-of a juvenile. Subpart (A)(4) includes both crime
against nature and aggravated crime against nature.
1172 . (Vol. 58
COMMENTS
895(H) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Louisiana Revised Statutes
15:574.4. The modified Article 895 specifically provides for community
notification and registration as a condition of probation and the modified
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.4 requires registration and notification as
condition of parole.' 3
Since its enactment in 1992,14 "Louisiana's Megan's Law" has been
challenged by sex offenders and civil libertarians as a violation of constitutional
rights." Generally, Louisiana courts have followed the rest of the nation in
holding that "Louisiana's Megan's Law" violates neither procedural nor
substantive due process, nor does it violate the Equal Protection clause.' 6
However, Louisiana has diverged from many other states by upholding
challenges to the statute when the defendant argues that its retroactive application
violates the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions. 7
This variance between Louisiana and other jurisdictions results from the fact that
other courts have found that "Megan's Law" does not fall within the scope of the
ex post facto clause. According to these decisions, "Megan's law" is not
"punishment" as far as the constitution is concerned, thus, the ex post facto
clause does not factor into the analysis.'" In Louisiana, however, it is unclear
whether the courts have concluded that our statute amounts to punishment.19
A strict reading of the cases in which "Megan's Law" has been challenged
reveals that Louisiana courts have been less than thorough in analyzing the
purpose and effect of the statute-a necessary prerequisite in determining
whether it meets the constitutional definition of "punishment."20 Whether this
failure stems from the fact that the issue was never argued on appeal, or because
13. La. R.S. 15:574.4 (Supp. 1998).
14. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:540-549 were enacted by Act 1147, section I, of 1997, and
became effective on June 18, 1992. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 895(H) and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 15:574.4 were enacted by Act 962, section 1, and became effective August 21,
1992.
15. See James Popkin etal.,NaturalBorn Predators, U.S. News& World Rep., Sept. 19, 1994,
at 64.
16. State v. Calhoun, 669 So. 2d 1359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
17. Calhoun, 669 So. 2d at 1362 (regarding La. R.S. 15:540-549 (Supp. 1998) only); State v.
Linson, 654 So. 2d 440, 446 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 660 So. 2d 470 (1995) (regarding La.
R.S. 15:540-549 (Supp. 1998) and La. Code Crim. P. art. 895(H)); and State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d
814 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 649 (1994) (regarding La. Code Crim. P. art. 895(H)
only).
18. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079
(9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d
1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Doe v. Weld, 954 F.
Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.N.J. 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995); People v. Afrika, 168 Misc.2d 618, 648 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996);
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738 (1996). But see Roe v. Office of Adult
Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1996); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996).
19. Without specifically examining the punitive nature of the statute, Louisiana cases have
found it subject to the ex post facto clause.
20. See supra authority cited in note 18.
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the courts have just assumed that "Megan's Law" amounts to punishment is
unclear. What is clear is that Louisiana's application of "Megan's Law" leaves
room for some sex offenders to avoid complying with the requirements. By
failing to rule on the punitive nature of "Louisiana's Megan's Law," the courts
may have limited the scope of the statute further than the legislature intended."D
This comment will focus on the constitutionality of applying "Louisiana's
Megan's Law" to sex offenders who committed their crimes prior to the
enactment of the law. The question raised is whether retroactive application of
"Megan's Law" violates the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal
constitutions-that is, whether the statute should be characterized as regulatory
or criminal. Part II will briefly review the statutes that comprise Louisiana's
"Megan's Law" and the jurisprudence interpreting these statutes. Part III will
examine the "punishment" requirement as it relates to the ex postfacto clause by
delineating the scope of the clause and examining the United States Supreme
Court's approach to the "punishment" issue in various contexts. Part IV will
review recent cases from other jurisdictions and describe how they have
attempted to develop a principled approach to the punishment issue in the sex
offender context. Part V will show why this principled approach should apply
in Louisiana and how our courts should approach the problem.
II. LOUISIANA'S VERSION OF "MEGAN'S LAW"
A. Statutes
Louisiana's sex offender legislation is contained in Chapter 3-A&B of
Revised Statute I5, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:540-549.22 The specific
registration and notification requirements are found in Section 542, "Registration
of sex offenders. 2 3 It provides that "[a]ny adult residing in this state who has
plead guilty or has been convicted of any sex offense shall register with the
sheriff of the parish of the person's residence. 2 4 Registration under this
paragraph must occur within forty-five days of establishing residence in the state
or thirty days after release from prison, whichever is later."
Section 542 also contains the community notification provision. A person
convicted of a sex offense must "[g]ive notice of the crime for which he was
convicted, his name, and address to: (a) At least one person in every residence
or business within a one mile radius in a rural area and a three square block area
21. See State v. Sorrell, 656 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 657 So. 2d
1035 (1995), where the court examined the language of the statute and stated "[flrom a reading of
La.R.S. 15:542E, we are of the opinion that the legislature clearly intended that La.R.S, 542 apply
to all those persons convicted of sex offenses before the statute was enacted."
22. La. R.S. 15:542-549 (Supp. 1998).
23. La. R.S. 15:542 (Supp. 1998).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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in an urban or suburban area of the address where the defendant will reside upon
release."2 The offender must also notify the superintendent of the school
district who can, in turn, direct the offender to notify the principals of particular
schools. 7 These notification requirements must be met within forty-five days
of establishing residence in the state or thirty days after release from prison,
whichever is later." Section 542 also provides the court some discretion in the
method of notification. Subsection (3) states that "[t]he court in which the
defendant was convicted of the offense that subjects him to the duty to register
may order any other form of notice which it deems appropriate, including but not
limited to signs, handbills, bumper stickers or clothing labeled to that effect."29
Shortly after the enactment of Sections 540-549, the Legislature passed 1992
Act No. 962 which amended Article 895 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.1.30 Article 895 now requires notification
and registration as a special condition of probation when the defendant has been
convicted of certain sex crimes and "probation is permitted by law."'"
Similarly, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.1 requires sex offenders, who are
paroled or those released on "good behavior,"32 to comply with the registration
and notification provisions. Both the notification and the registration require-
ments are the same under Section 574.4 and Article 895 as are required under
Section 542, the only difference is that they specifically apply to parolees and
probationers respectively.
B. Jurisprudence
While Louisiana courts have generally upheld these statutes, they have found
their retroactive application unconstitutional." What constitutes "retroactive,"
however, varies depending on the statute under which the offender must register.
For example, the critical time for determining whether "Louisiana's Megan's
Law" is retroactive for an offender sentenced under the general statute (Section
542) or released on probation under Article 895, is the time he committed the
offense. 4 If the statute was enacted subsequent to the commission of the
offense, utilization of "Megan's Law" is unconstitutional." On the other hand,
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. La. R.S. 15:574.1 (Supp. 1998).
31. La. Code Crim. P. 895.
32. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:571.5A(1) (Supp. 1998) provides that this type of release
shall be "as if released on parole."
33. See State v. Calhoun, 669 So. 2d 1359 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996); State v. Linson, 654 So.
2d 440 (La. App. Ist. Cir. 1996); State v. Payne, 633 So. 2d 701 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993).
34. Id.
35. State v. Sorrell, 656 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 657 So. 2d 1035 (1995).
The Sorrell decision was based on Bancroft v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections, 635 So. 2d 738 (La.
11751998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
when an offender is released from prison and registration is made a special
condition of parole under Section 574.4, the law in effect at the time of release
applies even if it had not been enacted at the time of the offense."
Louisiana first interpreted "Megan's Law" in State v. Payne." In that case,
the defendant claimed that application of the registration requirement was a
violation of the ex post facto provision of state and federal constitutions.3" The
first circuit agreed, stating that, "registration as a sex offender pursuant to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:540-549 exposes the defendant to additional
penalties for his criminal conduct."39 The court reasoned that an additional
"punishment" was the penalty provision of Section 54240 which applies if a
defendant fails to register.4 '
The court found the record unclear as to whether the defendant had been
sentenced under Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:540-549, or whether the
registration was a special condition of probation under Article 895(H) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.42 In either case, the court said that the defend-
ant's conduct occurred before either statute was enacted. 'Therefore, they are
both "unconstitutional as applied to this defendant."' 3 The result reached by the
court indicates that they found the statute to be "punishment." However, this
was never stated conclusively, nor was any "punishment" analysis performed.
The first circuit reaffirmed Payne in State v. Babin." The defendant, who
had been convicted of rape in 1992, claimed that application of 895(H) was
unconstitutional because the acts for which he was convicted were committed
prior to the statute's enactment.43 The court agreed saying that "[b]ecause the
App. 1st Cir. 1994) and Bickman v. Des, 367 So. 2d 283 (La. 1978), which hold that the law in
effect at the time of a prisoner's release governs the terms of that release, rather than the law in
effect at the time of the commission of the offense against the law in effect at the time of entry into
the good time credits program.
36. Sorrell, 656 So. 2d at 1046. In distinguishing between the requirements of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 15:542 and 15:574.4, the Sorrell court noted that, unlike Louisiana Revised Statutes
15:542, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.4 does not create a new offense for a sex offender's
failure to comply. Rather, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.4 creates an additional condition of
release on parole for diminution of sentence, such as a good time release. Sorrell, 656 So. 2d at
1047.
37. 633 So. 2d 701 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 702.
39. Id. at 703.
40. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:542 provides in pertinent part: "(F)(1) A person who fails
to register as required by this Section shall, upon first conviction be fined not more than one
thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. (2) Upon second or subsequent
convictions, whoever fails to register as required by this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than three years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence."
41. Payne, 633 So. 2d at 703.
42. Id. At the time of the Payne decision, it was unclear whether the constitutional analysis
was the same under 895 as it was under 542.
43. Id.
44. 637 So. 2d 814 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 649 (1994).
45. Id. at 824.
1176 [Vol. 58
COMMENTS
provisions of article 895 (H) were not in effect at the time of the commission of
defendant's crime, their application to defendant would be an unconstitutional
violation of the ex post facto provisions of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitu-
tions." -  Again, conspicuously missing from the court's opinion was any
finding that "Louisiana's Megan's Law" amounts to punishment.
In State v. Sorrell,"7 the fifth circuit created an exception to the general rule
that the ex post facto clause applies to "Louisiana's Megan's Law." The court
agreed with the defendant that application of Section 542 was unconstitutional
based on Babin and Payne.4' However, in Sorrell, the defendant was released
under Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.4 which falls under the part of Title 15
providing for parole.49 Section 574.4, as with Sections 542 and 895(H),
requires that, upon release from custody, sex offenders must give notice to
certain persons, including nearby residents, of his criminal history."0 However,
the statute differs from Sections 542 and 895(H) because it applies only to
offenders who are paroled or released on good time credit.5' The Sorrell court
said that Section 574.4 did not violate the ex post facto clause because it did not
create an additional offense after the defendant had already been convicted. All
the statute did, according to the court, was to create an additional condition for
release if the offender was discharged early." The court distinguished this from
a situation in which the legislature changed a parolee's requirements after he had
already been released."
From this trilogy of cases the application of "Louisiana's Megan's Law" can
be summarized as follows. First, it is clear that registration and notification are
required if the offender committed his crime after the legislation was enacted.
Similarly, Sorrell requires that any person paroled or released on good time
comply with "Louisiana's Megan's Law" even if the crime was committed before
passage of the statute. 4 However, the courts will not allow the provisions to
apply if the person committed the sex offense before the effective date of the
46. Id.
47. 656 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 657 So. 2d 1035 (1995).
48. Id. at 1047.
49. Id.
50. La. R.S. 15:574.4 (Supp. 1998).
51. Id. Specifically, it states that a person "eligible for diminution of sentence for good
behavior... convicted of one of the [enumerated] sex offenses..." shall comply with the parole
conditions provided in Section 574.4.
52. Sorrell, 656 So. 2d at 1047-48.
53. Id. The Sorrell rationale was followed by the first circuit in Lee v. State. Lee v. State, 681
So. 2d 1020 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996). The Lee court stated that when an offender is released from
prison either on "good time," or on parole, "the law in effect at the time of a prisoner's release
governs the terms of that release, rather than the law in effect at the time of the commission of the
offense." Lee, 681 So. 2d at 1023.
54. State v. Linson, 654 So. 2d 440, 446 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ dented, 660 So. 2d 470
(1995) (regarding La. R.S. 15:540-549 (Supp. 1998) and La. Code Crim. P. art. 895(H)); and State
v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 649 (1994) (regarding La.
Code Crim. P. art. 895(H) only).
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statute even if convicted after passage of the law unless he falls within the
Sorrell exception.
The crux of the court's reasoning in these cases appears to be to focus on
the status of the defendant (i.e. probationer or parolee) as opposed to the
language of the statute. Under this approach, an interesting situation can arise.
Imagine two sex offenders who committed their offenses prior to the effective
date of "Megan's Law," one who is subsequently released on "good time," the
other one serves his full sentence. Under the court's current interpretation, the
offender who is released on good time would be required to register based on
* Section 574.4. The other offender, arguably more dangerous since his prison
behavior did not warrant "good time" credit, would not be required to register.
Unusual as it may seem, the court's current interpretation of the statute mandates
this result.
The argument that has been upheld in some other states is that these
registration and notification provisions should not be subject to the ex post
facto limitation. These jurisdictions consider "Megan's Law" regulation, not
punishment. Obviously, Louisiana's interpretation is not the only reasoned one.
Moreover, given the sketchy arguments offered by Louisiana courts, one might
wonder whether it is the correct one. What Louisiana courts have apparently
failed to do is to apply their analysis in a step-by-step fashion. Before
proceeding directly to an application of the ex post facto clause, the court should
first delineate the breadth of the clause and determine whether the statute is even
subject to this restriction. If the statute is subject to the clause, the limitation
should be applied across the board without focusing on the defendant's status.
However, if the law does not come within the scope of the clause, it should be
applied as written. The next section will examine how the Supreme Court has
interpreted the scope of the ex post facto clause and how they have attempted to
clarify what constitutes punishment under the constitution.
III. "PUNISHMENT" UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
The phrase "ex post facto laws" is a term of art that was used in the legal
community long before it was used in the Constitution. 5 As it is used in the
Constitution, the phrase is generally understood to relate exclusively to criminal
or penal statutes, 6 and not to retrospective legislation of any other type.". In
other words, this prohibition is intended to limit the powers of states only with
55. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 637 (1979).
56. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,531,74 S. Ct. 737, 742 (1954); Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S. Ct. 512, 521 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39, 44 S. Ct. 283, 286
(1924); Bankers' Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647, 43 S. Ct. 233 (1923); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S. Ct. 607, 609 (1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242, 32
S. Ct. 613, 617 (1912).
57. See Bankers' Trust Co., 260 U.S. 647, 43 S. Ct. 233; Board of Comm'rs v. Forbes Pioneer
Boat Line, 86 So. 199 (Fla. 1920).
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regard to their ability to impose "punishment." 8 This section will examine the
scope of the Supreme Court's ex post facto doctrine and how the court has tried
to define what actually constitutes "punishment." By extracting the principles
that the court uses in these cases, it will be easier to make a reasoned evaluation
of sex offender legislation as a whole, and particularly "Louisiana's Megan's
Law."
A. Scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause
The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any
ex post facto Law."59 This is generally understood to prohibit the applica-
tion of a law to conduct that occurred before the law was enacted.' "Such
laws are generally deemed unfair, because ... the person ... can have no
notice, when the behavior took place, of such an after-made law which applies
to it."
61
The first real controversy over the proper interpretation of this clause came
during the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788.62 During the debates, James
Madison and Patrick Henry argued over the definition of ex post facto law.63
58. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.13, 97 S. Ct. 1505, 1515 n.13
(1977); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 153, 31 S. Ct. 171, 177 (1911). However,
the idea that the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws only applies to criminal laws
was called into question in several early Supreme Court decisions. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 136 (1810), where the seizure of a property by legislative pronouncement would
constitute an ex post facto law even though the property was seized for past conduct. This and other
decisions have led some Supreme Court Justices to observe that the Constitution's ban on ex post
facto laws should not be, and indeed has not been, confined to enactment's strictly criminal in nature.
So far, however, these justices have been in the minority. See Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 319, 75 S. CL 757, 766 (1955). In Lehmann v. United States, 353
U.S. 685, 690, 77 S. Ct. 1022, 1025 (1957), Justice Black, in a separate opinion in which Justice
Douglas concurred, stated that the definition which confines the operation of the ex post facto clause
of Article 1, section 9 to penal legislation which imposes or increases criminal punishment, is no
longer valid because of a line of decisions in which the Court has refused to limit the protections of
the clause to criminal cases and criminal punishments as those terms were defined in earlier times.
Cited in support of this statement were Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), and Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). See
also Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878), in which the court held that the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto legislation applied to prevent the retroactive operation of an act of
Congress, enforceable by civil suit, to collect a tax penalty. The Court found that the ex post facto
effect of a law cannot be evaded by giving a civil form to that which is essentially criminal. Had
the proceeding been taken by indictment instead of by a civil suit for the excess of the tax, and the
one was equally authorized with the other, the proceeding would have certainly fallen within the
description of an ex post facto law.
59. U.S. Const. art I, § 10.
60. 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 637 (1979).
61. William Winslow Crosskey, The True Meaning Of The Constitutional Prohibition Of Ex
Post Facto Laws, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 539, 547 (1947).
62. Id. at 547-48.
63. Id. at 547.
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Henry's fear was that the clause would be interpreted as synonymous with
retrospective law and would therefore be applicable to every act of the
legislature." Henry contended that if the terms were equivalent, a plethora of
problems could arise." Madison tried to quell Henry's hostility to the clause
by commenting that "in the Convention at Philadelphia, ex post facto. laws had
been interpreted as relating to criminal cases solely."" Madison's comment
illustrates that, whatever the initial framers thought an ex post facto law was,
from the beginning it was believed that regulatory statutes should not be within
its scope. 7
The ex post facto clause was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Calder v. Bull." In Calder, the Court had to decide whether a Connecticut law
that allowed decisions by probate courts to be appealed violated the ex post facto
clause. 9 The plaintiff claimed that the law was a violation because, in his case,
the probate court's decision had been issued before the law's passage.7.0 The
Court denied the plaintiff's claim, interpreting the clause as limited to crimes,
pains and penalties that were affected by subsequent laws.7' A much later court
emphasized the important role of punishment in ex post facto challenges,.
providing that "[u]nder the Ex Post Facto Clause, the government may not apply
a law retroactively that 'inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime, when committed. ,,
72
The Calder rule seemed unquestioned until 1898 when the court appeared
to move away from using punishment as the critical element. In Thompson v.
Utah," the Utah legislature had enacted a provision that changed the size of
juries in non-capital cases from twelve to eight persons.' The plaintiff claimed
that his conviction by the eight person jury was an ex post facto violation since
his indictment occurred before the statute was passed." The court, without
citing Calder, upheld the plaintiff's claim, stating that the test for whether a
statute is an ex post facto law, is whether the retroactive application "alters the
situation to [the defendant's] disadvantage."76
64. Id.
65. Henry's main concern involved the change-over from state currency to a national currency.
He wanted to ensure that the states received full value for the money already in print. Id. at 547.
66. Id. at 549 (internal quotes omitted).
67. Id. at 550.
68. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 390 (1798).
69. Id. at 386.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 391.
72. Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1252 (1996) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 DalI.) 386, 390 (1798)) (emphasis added).
73. 170 U.S. 343, 18 S. Ct. 620 (1898).
74. Id. at 344, 18 S. Ct. at 620.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 351, 18 S. Ct at 623.
1180 [Vol. 58
COMMENTS
The lower courts followed this fundamental shift 7 until Collins v. Young-
blood." The Collins Court specifically overruled Thompson stating that it was
inconsistent "with the understanding of the term ex post facto law at the time the
constitution was adopted.' 9 Thus, the Court set out to clarify the scope of the
ex post facto clause.80 According to the test developed in Collins, a law violates
the ex post facto clause if 1) it punishes as a crime an act previously committed,
which was innocent when done, 2) makes more burdensome the punishment for
a crime, after its commission, or 3) deprives one charged with a crime of any
defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed."'
Calder and Collins indicate that an operative factor in determining whether
a law falls within the scope of the ex post facto clause is whether the law can be
considered "punishment." Thus, the ex post facto ban has been held not to
prevent retrospective impairment of property rights.82 Courts have additionally
ruled that statutes authorizing annulment and divorce for acts antecedent to the
legislation were not ex post facto violations."3 The question in the "Megan's
Law" context, is whether registration and notification statutes are punishment and
subject to this constitutional restriction. To determine this, it is necessary to
examine the Supreme Court's rulings on "punishment" and try to derive some
concrete factors against which to compare this legislation.
B. The Supreme Court's Punishment Jurisprudence
At first blush, it seems that determining whether a law is "punishment"
should be simple. And, insofar as it was connected to the distinction between
civil and criminal laws, it once was. The idea that "classifications of 'civil' and
77. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (Ist Cir. 1992); American Power & Light Co.
v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 141 F.2d 206 (1st Cit. 1944); United States v. Gosciniak, 142 F.2d
240 (7th Cir. 1944); Voorhees v. Cox, 140 F.2d 132 (8th Cit. 1944); Chandler v. Johnston, 133 F.2d
139 (9th Cir. 1943); Stroud v. Hohnston, 139 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1943); Landay v. United States, 108
F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1939); Balistreri v. United States. 100 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1938); Leon v. Torruella,
99 F.2d 851 (1st Cit. 1938); United States ex rel. Feuer v. Day, 42 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1930); Howard
v. United States, 26 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cit. 1928); Tyomies Pub. Co. v. United States, 211 F. 385 (6th
Cit. 1914); Erbaugh v. United States, 173 F. 433 (8th Cit. 1909); Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 117
F. 462 (8th Cit. 1902).
78. 497 U.S. 37, 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990).
79. Id. at 47, 110 S. Ct. at 2722.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 42, IIO S. Ct. at 2719.
82. Baltimore & Susquehanna R.R. Co. v. Nesbit, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 395 (1850); Watson v.
Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 (1834); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Also, an Executive
order freezing prices, rents, wages, and salaries under Economic Stabilization Act did not represent
ex post facto law, as applied to invalidate increase in season ticket prices charged by owners of
professional football club. Dc Rieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896, 95 S. Ct. 176 (1974).
83. Callahan v. Callahan, 15 S.E. 727 (S.C. 1892); 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation
§ 14 (1983).
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'criminal' can be an inclusive, accurate, and mutually exclusive description of
all positive law might well have fitted the economic and legal life of the early
eighteenth century.""4 Today, however, we are faced with a government which,
for better or worse, regulates a great deal of our life." To this extent, it is
sometimes very difficult to distinguish between statutes that have compensation
as their goal and those whose purpose is to punish. 6 As laws that attempt to
regulate conduct have become more complex, so has the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on where the line is between laws that "punish" and those whose
purpose is merely "regulation."
Over the years the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of whether
other types of governmental action constituted punishment, not only in the
context of the ex post facto clause but also in the contexts of.the double jeopardy
clause, 7 the excessive fines clause," and both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
safeguards for individuals subjected to proceedings of a punitive nature. 9 The
Supreme Court's first real articulation of a standard for answering the "punish-
ment" question came in the 1963 decision Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez."
Although the Kennedy test has for the most part been rejected,9 it is a helpful
starting point to help place the Court's recent jurisprudence in proper perspec-
tive.92
84. Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and Substantive
Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett Trop, Perez. and Speiser Cases, 34 Ind L.J.
231, 273 (1959).
85. See generally Peter B. McCutchen, Mistake. Precedent. and the Rise of the Administrative
State: Toward A Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1994). Kenneth
Mann. Putative Civil Sanctions: The Middle Ground Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 Yale L.J.
1795 (1992).
86. See Mann, supm note 85, at 1798.
87. U.S. Const. amend. V.
88. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
89. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J.
1325, 1330 (1991).
90. 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963).
91. Post-Kennedy cases reveal that the Court applies the seven-factor, analysis only when the
nature of the proceeding (i.e., criminal versus civil) is at issue, and not when the nature of the sanction
(i.e., punitive or regulatory) is in question. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611, 113
S. Ct. 2801, 2806 n.6 (1993) (considering the criminal or civil nature of forfeiture proceedings and
finding that "[iun addressing the separate question whether punishment is being imposed, the Court has
not employed the tests articulated in [Kennedy]"); see also Schopf, supra note 5, at 132 (arguing that
"the bulk of recent case law suggests" that application of the Kennedy criteria to determine whether
community notification constitutes punishment would be "inappropriate"). Because the criminal/civil
distinction is different from the punitive/regulatory determination, see United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 447-48, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901-02 (1989), Kennedy's significance in making the former
determination does not ensure its appropriateness in making the latter.
92. Also, some recent decisions imply that while Kennedy may not be a valid test, its factors
may be considered in analyzing the punitive effects of a statute. Therefore, Kennedy remains quite
relevant in certain contexts. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
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1. The Rise and Fall of the Kennedy Test
In Kennedy, the court was asked to determine the constitutionality of
provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952. These statutes mandated the loss of citizenship for leaving or
remaining outside the country in order to evade military service." The
plaintiffs argued that the statutes imposed punishment without due process
because they were not accorded rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, including notice, compulsory process, confrontation, trial by jury
and assistance of counsel.9 In upholding the plaintiffs' claim, the court stated
that "the punitive nature of the sanction here is evident under the tests tradition-
ally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in
character.. . ."" The factors the Kennedy court found applicable were:
1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
2) whether it has historically been regarded as a "punishment,"
3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of "punish-
ment"-retribution and deterrence,
5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.96
The Kennedy Court made it clear, however, that it would use this multi-fac-
tor or comparative approach only if there was real doubt about whether the
legislature intended a proceeding to be civil or criminal.9" As the Court has
stated repeatedly: "whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction.""'  Only if there is marked
uncertainty over what the legislature intended, or if the defendant provides "clear
proof' that "the statutory scheme [was] so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate [the State's] intention," will the court engage in the factor analysis."
Indeed, the Kennedy court did not rely on these factors because the "congressio-
nal purpose indicate[d] conclusively" that the measure was punitive."°
93. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 159, 83 S. Ct. at 562.
94. Id. at 148, 83 S. Ct. at 557.
95. Id. at 168, 83 S. Ct. at 567.
96. Id. at 168-69, 83 S. Ct. at 567-68.
97. Id.; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-51,100 S. CL 2636,2642-44 (1980)
(illustrating this approach).
98. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S. Ct. at 2641; see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368,
106 S. Ct. 2988, 2992 (1986); One Lot Emerald Cut Stonesand One Ring v, United States, 409 U.S.
232, 237, 93 S. Ct. 489, 493 (1972).
99. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369, 106 S. Ct. at 2992.
100. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169, 83 S. CL at 568. The Kennedy Court itself admitted that the
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Since the Kennedy decision, courts have implied that there are problems with
using this test to determine whether a statute has a punitive or regulatory
effect.'0 ' First, there is no evidence that the Supreme Court intended the
Kennedy factors to be a "test."' 02 "In Kennedy, the court ... simply listed
various factors ... each of which had been used by itself in reaching a
determination of whether a statute was penal (criminal) or regulatory (civil), and
each of which therefore might be relevant in the future in making that
determination, whether alone or in conjunction with the others."'0" The New
Jersey Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he [Kennedy] 'test' is really not used as
a 'test' at all even in those cases where it is properly considered."'"
Another problem with applying Kennedy is that many Post.-Kennedy Supreme
Court decisions call into question the propriety of this approach when it is the
nature of the sanction, not the nature of proceeding, that is in dispute.' 5
Noting this, it has been said that "[t]he clear thrust of repeated Supreme Court
decisions is that the [Kennedy] test has been rejected in all contexts other than
those that present the question whether the proceedings are civil or criminal" and,
therefore, whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment's are implicated.0 6
"Because the criminal/civil distinction is different from the punitive/regulatory
determination, Kennedy's significance in making the former determination does
not ensure its appropriateness in making the latter.'
0 7
2. Development of a Principled Approach
In cases involving the type of sanction imposed, the Supreme Court has
abandoned the Kennedy approach in favor of a case-by-case analysis of
"punishment."' 0 8 Lower courts that have rejected Kennedy have tried to
formulate a test structured around certain factors derived from these ad hoc
factors "may often point in differing directions," id., and comparative analysis of court evaluations
suggests that, in the context of sex offender statutes, they most certainly have. See Abril R. Bedarf,
Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 885, 913-14 (1995) (stating
that "despite [judges'] use of the same seven-factor test, courts are split fairly evenly in the
conclusions they reach"). Notwithstanding subsequent lower court decisions that have applied the
Kennedy test, there is some doubt as to whether the Court intended it to be used in every factual
situation that might arise. Since the Court never actually relied upon it in Kennedy itself, or in any
subsequent decision, the language can only be termed dicta.
101. See Prevention, supra note 6, at 1717.
102. Id. at 1721.
103. Id.
104. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
105. See Prevention, supra note 6, at 1721 n.90.
106. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 397 n.14.
107. See Prevention, supra note 6, at 1721 n.90.
108. United States v. Helper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989); Dc Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144, 80 S. Ct. 1146 (1960). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in California Dep't of
Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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decisions.'" The following section will review these leading cases focusing
on the principles that the Supreme Court finds relevant in determining the
punitive character of a particular statute. These principles include: 1) the actual
or stated legislative purpose behind the statute; 2) the objective purpose; 3) the
historical nature of the sanction, and 4) the overall effect of the statute." 0
a. Actual Purpose-De Veau v. Braisted
In De Veau v. Braisted,"' the Supreme Court adopted a test focusing on
the actual legislative purpose."' In that case, the plaintiff challenged, on bill
of attainder and ex post facto grounds, a law prohibiting unions from employing
felons."' The law barred convicted felons from working on the New York and
New Jersey waterfront." 4 In ruling that there was no punishment the Court
said "[tihe question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought to
bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to
punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present
situation, such as the qualifications of a profession."" 5
De Veau stands for the idea that "punishment," is a matter of legislative
intent. However, this intent is not always easy to determine because a legislature
acts as a collective body, each individual's purpose may be vastly different from
that of the whole."6 However, there are different methods for making this
determination. Generally, if the statute contains a "purpose" or a "finding"
section, the legislative purpose can be derived from the language of the
statute."17 Also, the legislative purpose can be derived by examining transcripts
from debate hearings. If it is still unclear, the design and placement of the
statute can also be helpful in making this determination. For example, a statute
that is enacted as part of a state's criminal code might indicate a punitive aim.
109. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d
1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Doe v. Weld, 954
F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996); Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995);
State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 533 (N.H. 1994); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J.
1995); People v. Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); Kitze v. Commonwealth, 475
S.E.2d 830 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). But cf Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994)
(holding registration is punitive where dissemination of information will result).
110. See supra authority in note 109.
III. 363 U.S. 144, 80 S. Ct. 1146(1960).
112. Id. at 145, 80 S. Ct. I148.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 160, 80 S. Ct. at 1155.
116. Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 81 (Little, Brown & Co.
1975).
117. Id. at 97.
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The language in De Veau might suggest that the subjective intent of the
legislature is always controlling. However, subsequent Supreme Court cases
make it clear that this is not so. 18 Even though the actual or stated purpose
of the legislature may denote a non-punitive goal, a statute will be considered.
punishment if its objective purpose is to punish.
b. Objective Purpose through Proportionality-United States v.
Halper
The Court has expressed two different methods for determining the objective
purpose of a particular statute. The first is the proportionality of the penalty, i.e.
whether the sanction is too harsh to be considered regulatory. The second is by
examining the historical nature of the penalty.
In United States v. Halper,"9 the Court articulated an "objective" legisla-
tive intent test.' 2 The question in Halper was whether a civil fine could be
so large that it could constitute "punishment" and, therefore, be a violation of the
double jeopardy clause. 2' The Court first looked at whether the statute served
the purposes of "punishment," including retribution and deterrence or instead,
satisfied a remedial purpose.' The Court conceded that "a civil as well as a.
criminal sanction [could] constitute 'punishment."" 2'  The question was
whether the statute served the twin aims of retribution and deterrence. 24 If the
civil sanction could only be explained by these goals, it should be considered
"punishment.""'
The Halper Court found that the fine had "no rational relation" to the
legitimate remedial purpose of compensating the government. 26 Therefore, the
double jeopardy clause was implicated to "to the extent that the second sanction
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribu-
tion."'27
Based on the Halper logic, a court can determine the objective purpose of
the legislature by examining whether the measure is narrowly tailored to a
remedial goal, i.e. one that is not based on deterrence or retribution. Halper's
significance was described by the Third Circuit in Artway v. Attorney General
of New Jersey.. as, "depart[ing] from the practice of placing talismanic
significance on the legislative labels affixed to the disputed provision and
118. E.g., supra authority note 109.
119. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989)..
120. Id. at 453, 109 S. CL at 1904 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 447, 109 S. Ct. at 1901.
122. Id. at 448, 109 S. CL at 1902.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 449, 109 S. Ct. at 1902.
127. Id. at 448-49, 109 S. Ct. at 1902.
128. 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1997).
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searching for the frequently unknowable and nondispositive subjective intent of
the legislative body."'
2 9
c. Objective Purpose through History-Austin v. United States
In Austin v. United States,'30 the Court purported to apply Halper by
focusing on the historical nature of the sanction. The question in Austin was
whether a civil penalty could be so excessive as to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.'3' The statute in question was a forfeiture provision that allowed for
seizure of a person's property if convicted of a drug offense.' 2 The govern-
ment argued that the forfeiture statute served the remedial purpose of compensat-
ing the government for its costs in investigating and prosecuting these offens-
es.' 33 The court cited Halper, but instead of looking at the proportionality of
the fine-whether it was too excessive-the court examined the statute in a
historical context."' The Austin Court concluded that the language and
legislative history of the statute as a whole indicated that the forfeiture statute
served a punitive purpose, regardless of the proportionality of the particular
forfeiture to the government's costs.
35
d. The History Exception-Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch
136
After deciding Austin, the Court faced a double jeopardy challenge based on
a state tax on illegal drugs.'3 In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, the
defendant claimed that a Montana law, which-taxed illegal drugs, was unconstitu-
tional because it was "a concoction of anomalies, too far removed in crucial
respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as 'punish-
ment' for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis.'.
Under Halper's "purpose" test, the tax could fairly be characterized as
punitive. 39 But, because the sanction was a tax, it did not fall within Austin's
historical test since taxes have historically been used for the purpose of raising
revenue.' ° The Court looked at whether this paiticular tax operated in a
129. Id. at 1256.
130. 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
131. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
132. 509 U.S. at 605, 113 S. Ct. at 2801.
133. Id. at 620, 113 S. Ct. at 2816.
134. Id. at 610, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
135. Id. at 617-23, 113 S. C1. at 2810-12.
136. 511 U.S. 767, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
137. Id. at 769-78, 114 S. Ct. at 1941.
138. Id. at 783, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
139. Id. at 775, 114 S. Ct. at 1944.
140. Id. at 779-80, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
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manner different than other taxes, concluding that this tax was different than both
revenue-raising taxes and mixed-motive taxes.'4 ' The Court felt that pure
revenue-raising taxes are not "punishment," because they are imposed despite
their negative effect, not because of it."42 Mixed-motive taxes are not "punish-
ment" because the government feels the revenue-raising aspect of the law
outweighs the harm.'" However, when the activity that is taxed is illegal, "the
legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might support such a tax could be equally
well served by increasing the fine imposed upon conviction."'44 The Court felt
that because this tax was essentially just a fine with another name, the historical-
ly non-punitive purposes of taxes could not insulate it from being considered
"punishment.""'
Even though the court found this measure "punishment," it is important to
note that it was neither the high rate of tax nor the "obvious deterrent purpose"
that made the tax "punishment," but rather the fact that it did not operate in the
usual manner consistent with its historical purpose.'" Thus, Kurth Ranch sets
up a narrow exception to Austin. The court also pointed out that "whether a
sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's
perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment."' 4' By
disallowing this subjective view of punishment, what the court essentially does
is to set up an objective, or "reasonable person" standard for making a
punishment determination.
e. Effects---California Department of Corrections v. Morales
In California Department of Corrections v. Morales,"' the Court added
another element to the "punishment" analysis.'" 9 The plaintiff in Morales
brought an ex post facto challenge to a California statute that decreased a
prisoner's entitlement to parole eligibility hearings."0 At the time the defen-
dant committed his crime, the law provided for parole suitability hearings every
year after a prisoner's initial parole determination."' The statute was subse-
quently amended to give the board more discretion in conducting the pre-parole
hearings." 2 The complaint was brought by a prisoner who had his first parole
141. Id. at 781, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
142. Id. at 782, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 780, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 777, 114 S. Ct. at 1945 n.14.
148. 514 U.S. 499, 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995).
149. Id. at 509, 115 S. Ct at 1603.
150. Id. at 504,115 S. CL at 1600.
151. Id. at 503, 115 S. Ct. at 1600.
152. Id.
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hearing under the prior law, but had subsequent hearings shelved under the
amendment."'
The court rejected the claim that application of this law was an ex post facto
violation, holding that the legislative measure did not constitute "punish-
ment."'54 The court declared that the "legislation at issue . . . effects no
change in the definition" of the defendant's crime."' The court conceded that
if the result of the statute was the extension the defendant"s sentence, the act
would constitute punishment.' However, in this case, the requirements
'contained in the new law effectively limited the possibility of extending a
prisoner's sentence.' 7 The court stated that the statute "creates only the most
speculative and attenuated [risk] ... of increasing the measure of punishment for
the covered crimes ... "'s
Under Morales, a law can constitute unconstitutional "punishment" merely
based on the effect it has on the defendant. It is possible that a statute could
have such a harsh effect on those that it is intended to sanction, that it can only
be considered "punishment" regardless of the legislature's purpose. If Morales
is applied in conjunction with De Veau and Halper's "intent based" tests, it can
act as a bar to harsh results that could occur if the analysis was limited to intent.
C. The State of Punishment Jurisprudence
These cases suggest that whether a statute is punishment or not is based on
two overriding factors. First, the intent of the legislature. This determination
requires an examination of both the text of a particular statute and other factors
indicative of legislative intent. Secondly, the Court will examine the effect the
statute has on the defendant from an objective point of view. This "principled"
or "multi-factored" analysis is how a majority of the lower courts are handling
this question when examining "Megan's Law."
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether "Megan's Law" is punishment
or not. Until they do, lower courts are left with the current "punishment"
jurisprudence to try and develop a test for answering this critical question.
Whether a court chooses to apply the Kennedy analysis, or to formulate their own
test based on the principles articulated above, it is imperative that the court
classifies the statute as either "punishment" or "regulation" so that it is clear
what constitutional limits apply.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 505, 115 S. Ct. at 1601.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 507. 115 S. Ct. at 1602.
158. Id. at 509. 115 S. C1. at 1603.
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IV. Is "MEGAN'S LAW" "PuNISHMENT?"-APPLICATION OF A PRINCIPLED
APPROACH
Even though the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the constitution-
ality of sex offender legislation, the foregoing cases suggest that a proper
"punishment" analysis, no matter what the context, should focus on certain
factors. These factors include both subjective and objective intent of the
legislature, whether this type of restriction has historically been considered
punishment, and whether the effects of the statute are so harsh that it must be
characterized as punishment.
There has been very little consistency among lower courts, both state and
federal, in interpreting sex offender legislation.'5 9 Nevertheless, three distinct
approaches can be derived from the jurisprudence. The first method can best be
described as the "intuitive approach." Generally, these courts either fail to ask
the punishment question, or merely ask whether the sanction looks like
"punishment."060 While this inquiry is certainly the simplest method, it fails
to give proper deference to law makers, and it fails to provide any consistency
or predictability. This approach has fallen into disuse and can only be found in
a few Louisiana cases.' 61
The other two approaches that are being applied by the courts are the
Kennedy test, and a test formulated from the De Veau-Halper principles. As
discussed earlier, the Kennedy approach has several problems and has been
implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court and explicitly rejected by many lower
courts. 62 Recently, De Veau-Halper principles have emerged as the favored
tools for analyzing the punitive nature of "Megan's Law." This section will look
at how courts have taken these principles into account in developing their own
punishment test when interpreting sex offender notification statutes. This section
should illustrate how this principled approach works and why it should be used
to interpret Louisiana's version of "Megan's Law."
A. Creation of a Principled Approach: Doe v. Portiz
The De Veau-Halper method was first used in the sex offender context by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz.'63 In a long and detailed
opinion, the court upheld the "Megan's Law" requirements stating that
The Registration and Notification Laws are not retributive laws, but
laws designed to give people a chance to protect themselves and their
159. See supra authority note 95.
160. Unfortunately, Louisiana seems to be the only state that falls within this category. See
supra text accompanying notes 34-57.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
162. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995); State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
163. 662 A.2d 367. 372 (NJ. 1995).
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children. They do not represent the slightest departure from [New
Jersey's] or our country's fundamental belief that criminals, convicted
and punished, have paid their debt to society and are not to be punished
further. They represent only the conclusion that society has the right to
know of their presence not in order to punish them, but in order to
protect itself.'"
The court first examined the purpose of the statute stating that "[t]he
provisions of New Jersey's sex offender registration and community notification
law are clearly designed to further the permissible, public safety purpose of the
law, not to punish on the basis of past acts. Megan's Law is intended and
tailored to serve this permissible, nonpunitive regulatory purpose."'' Com-
menting on the possible punitive impact on offenders, the court said "[t]he fact
that some deterrent punitive impact may result does not, however, transform
those provisions into 'punishment' if that impact is an inevitable consequence of
the regulatory provision, as distinguished from an impact that results from
excessive provisions, provisions that do not advance the regulatory purpose."'"
This case is important for two reasons. First, it was the first clear
articulation of why the Kennedy factors were inapplicable in the sex offender
context holding that "the test is not applied at all by the Supreme Court in ex
post facto or double jeopardy (multiple punishment) cases to determine whether
a sanction constitutes punishment." Secondly, this case was the first to group De
Veau, Halper, Austin, and Morales into a cohesive test examining the punitive
characteristics of "Megan's Law." While the Doe approach has been slightly
modified in subsequent cases, its basic framework continues to constitute the
majority approach.
B. Expansion: Artway's "Punishment" Analysis
In Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey6 7 and EB v. Verniero,'.
the same New Jersey statute analyzed in Poritz was challenged in Federal Court.
In Artway, the District Court upheld a challenge on ex post facto grounds and the
state appealed the case to the Third Circuit. The Artway court developed a test
based on the De Veau-Halper principles and applied it to the registration
provision of the statute. Because the Artway plaintiffs had not been affected by
the notification provision, the court found the challenge to this portion of the
statute was not justiciable.'69 However, the court. said that the same punish-
164. Id. at 372-73.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 390.
167. 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
168. 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
169. The Artway court limited its analysis to the registration provisions contained in the statute.
The court found that the challenge to the notification provision was not ripe. Artway, 81 F.3d at
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ment analysis would apply if an appropriate challenge was brought against the
notification provision. Shortly after Artway, EB v. Verniero arrived in the same
court bringing with it a justiciable claim against the notification provision. Thus,
the Third Circuit was able to answer the questions left open by the Artway
decision.
The plaintiffs in both cases were sex offenders who were convicted of their
offenses prior to the enactment of "Megan's Law."'' 70 The plaintiffs claimed
that, since the law was passed after their conviction, the registration and
notification requirements violated the ex post facto and double jeopardy
protections.' The court applied the De Veau line of cases to develop a
three-prong analysis-(l ) stated purpose, (2) objective purpose, and (3)
effect. 12 The Artway court, in defense of its formulation, noted the disagree-
ment among courts that have faced the "punishment" question stating that "[w]e
realize, however, that our synthesis is by no means perfect," and that "[o]nly the
Supreme Court knows where all the pieces belong."'1
7 3
To determine the actual purpose of the statute, the Artway court looked at
the stated legislative intent contained in the purpose statement in the act
itself.'74  The court had no trouble finding that protecting the public and
preventing future crimes are regulatory, not punitive, purposes.1' Both the
Artway and Verniero courts noted that, according to De Veau, "[p]rotecting the
public and preventing crimes are the types of purposes [the Supreme Court has]
found 'regulatory' and not punitive.""'7  The court divided the objective
purpose inquiry into three questions:'17  whether the law purpose was remedial,
whether the statute was analogous to other historical forms of punishment, and
finally, whether the statute contained any incidental deterrent effects.
1252. However, in Verniero the court was able to analyze the notification provisions. Verniero, 119
F.3d at 1087.
170. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1243; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1081.
171. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1247; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1087.
172. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1254; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1093.
173. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263.
174. The statute stated:
1. The Legislature finds and declares:
a. The danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders and offenders who commit other
predatory acts against children, and the dangers posed by persons who -prey on others as
a result of mental illness, require a system of registration that will permit law enforcement
officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety.
b. A system of registration of sex offenders and offenders who commit other predatory
acts against children will provide law enforcement with additional information critical to
preventing and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2c:7-1 (West 1995).
175. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1097.
176. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1097.
177. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264-68; Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1097.
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First, the court said "we must discern whether the law can be explained
solely by a remedial purpose." ''  This language clearly comes .from
Halper."9 Building on this Halper reference, the court said that the "remedial
purpose of helping law enforcement agencies keep tabs on these offenders fully
explains requiring certain sex offenders to register,"'80 and that "registration
and law enforcement notification only-is not excessive in any way.''es The
Verniero court stated that "[t]he relevant issue [under this prong] is whether these
provisions are 'reasonably related' to a legitimate goal."' 82 In other words, "If
a reasonable legislator motivated solely by the declared remedial goals could
have believed the means chosen were justified by those goals, then an objective
observer would have no basis for perceiving a punitive purpose in the adoption
of those means."'8
The court found that goal of "identifying potential recidivists, notifying those
who are likely to interact with such recidivists to the extent necessary to protect
public safety, and helping prevent future incidents of sexual abuse"'' could be
reasonably accomplished through notification.' 5 The idea that notification to
persons likely to encounter the offender, like those who live nearby, could help
protect the public was, in the courts words, "not an unreasonable premise."'86
Additionally, the court felt that "these goals have not been pursued in a way that
has imposed a burden on registrants that clearly exceeds the burden inherent in
accomplishment of the goals."'8 7 In other words, the court found a "reasonable
'fit' between the end[s] and means" of the statute.' 8
Next, the court looked at history to see if registration and notification have
been traditional methods of "punishment."'8 9 The Artway court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim that registration should be considered "shaming" saying that
registration alone was insufficient to equal a modem day "scarlet letter."'"
The court did note however, that notification was a much harder case. 19 In
Verniero the court distinguished "public shaming," "humiliation," or "banish-
ment" from mere dissemination of information.' The court said that "these
colonial practices inflicted punishment because they either physically held the
178. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264.
179. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct 1892 (1987).
180. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265.
181. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1097.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1098.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1099.
189. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265; Verniero, 119 F.3d at I101.
190. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1265.
191. Id.
192. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1099.
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person up before his or her fellow citizens for shaming or physically removed
him or her from the community."'193 The fact that this information causes
some "sting" to the defendant does not render it punishment. 94 The effect it
has on the defendant does not come from the state placing the defendant up for
ridicule, but from the dissemination of accurate information about past criminal
activity-information that is a matter of public record.' The court said this
is an important distinction because, "[d]issemination of information about
criminal activity has always held the potential for substantial negative conse-
quences for those involved in that activity."'9 However, it has never been
considered punishment when made in pursuit of a legitimate, non-punitive
goal.197
The conclusion reachedby the majority on this prong of the Artway test was
strongly criticized by the dissent in Verniero.' 9 Judge Becker stated that
adopting the Artway 'standard was the correct approach.'" However, he felt
that the court mischaracterized the importance of "shaming" as a historical
analog to notification."°  Important in this mischaracterization was the
majority's failure to focus on the fact that the dissemination of information under
the New Jersey statute was "state directed."' '' He said that the deliberate
decision to propagate the information in this way changes the focus of the history
analysis. 20 2  In his view, the court "must look to measures in which the
dissemination of criminal history information is state-run, not to measures in
which the dissemination occurs independently from state action. "203
That the form of dissemination under Megan's Law (written notice) is
different from the form of dissemination of the shaming punishments
(public display of the offender) is immaterial. Public display in modem
society simply would not accomplish the goals of notification; not all
those "likely to encounter" the released offender would be notified by
public display.'
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. New Jersey law specifically guarantees public access to all court records, including those
concerning criminal prosecutions. See Doe, 662 A.2d 367,407 (N.J. 1995) (citing Executive Order
No. 123). Moreover, as the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Doe, any person, under New Jersey
law, "may obtain a complete criminal history from the State Police by providing a name and either
date of birth or social security number and paying a fifteen dollar fee."
196. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1099.
197. Id. at 1099-1100.
198. Id. at 1112.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1114.
201. Id. at 1115.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at lllS n.3.
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This history element of the test is where there is the most disagreement
among courts applying a De Veau/Halper type analysis. There are strong
arguments on both sides as to the significance these early forms of punishment
have with regard to "Megan's Law" so it is difficult to come to a conclusive
determination. But, this disagreement does raise several questions about the
importance of this "history element" that may ultimately have to be resolved by
the Supreme Court.
First, how important a part does history play in determining whether a
statute constitutes punishment? If all other factors indicate that the statute is
regulatory, will a historical analog subject the statute to the constitution's
"punishment" limitations? Second, what "history" should a court examine?
Cases that have applied a history test all seem to examine colonial America.
However, the history of punishment may be different in different states. For
example, the legal history of punishment in Louisiana is very different because
of the strong French and Spanish influence as opposed to the English influence
in the colonies. Should the standard be that of the colonies, or of the particular
state? It appears that until some of these questions are answered, results under
this prong may remain unpredictable.
The third factor in determining the objective purpose under the Artway
standard is examining whether there is any incidental deterrent effects."' The
court characterized this element as a "savings provision.
'2°6
[E]ven if the remedial purpose of a measure cannot fairly be said to
justify all of its aspects, it will nevertheless be found nonpunitive if
measures of this type, like taxes, have traditionally served both remedial
and deterrent purposes and the particular measure before the court
serves such purposes in a manner consistent with its analogous
antecedents. °7
The court found that there were not incidental deterrent effects, so resort to this
exception was unnecessary.20'
The final prong of the Artway test examines the effect of the statute. The
court reiterated that "[w]hile even a substantial 'sting' will not render a measure
'punishment,'... at some level the 'sting' will be so sharp that it can only be
considered punishment regardless of the legislators' subjective thoughts." 2"
From the court's language, this is a very high standard to meet and is considered
"in the light of the importance of any legitimate governmental interest
served."2 ' The Artway court said that the registration provision had little
205. Id. at 1101.
206. Id.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Artway v. Attorney Gen. of NJ., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)).
210. Id.
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impact on the plaintiff because "[m]ost of the information is already available in
the public record.... Therefore, this impact, even coupled with the registrant's
inevitable kowtow to law enforcement officials, cannot be said to have an effect
so draconian that it constitutes 'punishment' in any way approaching incarcera-
tion.""'
The Verniero court said that "[tihe direct effects of Megan's Law clearly do
not rise to the level of extremely onerous burdens that sting so severely as to
compel a conclusion of punishment. All Megan's Law mandates is registration
and notification., 212 However, the court did characterize the indirect effects
as extremely harsh. 2'3  The court noted that the registrants had suffered
isolation, harassment, and loss of employment opportunities."t 4 The court
divided these indirect effects into two groups.215  First the court said that
isolation and loss of employment opportunities are considered reputational
interests and are constitutionally protected. 't6 These interest, however, must
be balanced against the state's interest in protecting the public.2"7 The court
cites the recent Supreme Court decision Hendricks, for the proposition that a
fundamental right may be violated if the state's interest is sufficiently impor-
tant.2"' Therefore, "[g]iven that something less than a fundamental interest is
implicated, the impact of Megan's Law on the registrants' reputational interests
is necessarily insufficient alone to constitute 'punishment."' t 9
The second indirect effect that the court worried about was retributive
attacks from the community."' The court did note that there was evidence
some offenders faced hostility, vandalism and assault from neighbors who
received notification about sex offenders living nearby.22' While the court
could understand the concern over these acts of violence, they were not
persuaded that "the magnitude of the risk ... require[d] classification of
[Megan's Law] as punishment., 2 2 Additionally, the court noted that these
incidents of violence were relatively rare and that the plaintiffs were not faced
with a greater risk of harm then anyone else who had committed a reprehensible
crime."'
211. Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267.
212. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1102.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1103.
219. Id. at 1104.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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C. "Megan's Law" as "Punishment": Pataki
In Doe v. Paaki,224 the United States District Court of New York used the
De Veau-Halper analysis in determining that New York's statute did amount to
punishment. The Pataki court's version of this test contains four prongs: 1) the
legislative intent, 2) the design of the statute, 3) whether the requirements
contained in the statute have been historically considered "punishment", and 4)
the effects of the statute.2 .
In examining the legislative intent, the court did not give the stated
legislative purpose the deference given by the Artway and Verniero court. 26
The Pataki court stated that "the legislature's description of a statute as civil
does not foreclose the possibility that it has a punitive character. '2 7 Therefore,
along with the objective purpose, the legislative intent must be examined
subjectively.22' After a thorough examination of the legislative debates, the
court concluded that "there are strong indications that, both subjectively and
objectively, the legislature also intended to punish sex offenders." 29 The court
said that the debate transcripts illustrate a "passion, anger, and desire to
punish."230
Next, the court examined the design of the statute. 3' This prong is based
on whether the statute is narrowly designed to achieve a non-punitive result. 2
The court implied that a sex offender statute could be sufficiently narrow to be
considered regulatory, but in the instant case it was not.2"' New York's statute
allowed for excessive disclosure of the registration information and "[i]t
cover[ed] a broad group of individuals, including first time offenders as well as
individuals who do not even engage in sexual conduct." 234 Therefore, the court
concluded that the statute was "designed in such a fashion as to suggest that it
is punitive. "235
The Pataki court found that there were "two types of analogous measures
that suggest that community notification is punitive: stigmatization and
224. 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
225. Id. at 616.
226. Id. at 621. The Pataki court focused on the legislative hearings in determining the
subjective intent. In Artway and Verniero, the court focused more on the preamble of the statute.
Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1264 (3d Cir. 1996); Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1097.
227. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 621 (citing Department of Ray. of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
767, 777, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1945)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 623.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
1998] 1197
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
banishment." 36 After reviewing the history of colonial America and the works
of Blackstone, the court stated that "[p]ublic notification is the modem-day
equivalent of branding and shaming."" The court rejected the argument that
"the purpose of the Act is not to humiliate or draw public ridicule but to
protect."238  The court again cited the legislative debates which indicate a
"punitive" purpose. 39 Also, the court said that the legislative purpose is not
the sole consideration, and that "common sense dictates, and the cases clearly
hold, that other factors must be considered as well. °"
The court also analogized the statute to "banishment" stating that "[n]otifica-
tion statutes have resulted in the banishment of sex offenders both literally and
psychologically.24' Not only have sex offenders literally been forced to
relocate to different towns and even different states, public notification has made
it difficult if not impossible for them to reintegrate into society. ts
2
Finally, the court looked at the overall effect of the statute.24 3 The court
agreed "that an otherwise regulatory law is not rendered punitive merely because
it imposes unpleasant consequences." 2" However, the court also felt that the
converse must be true, that is, that a punitive statute could also have regulatory
effects.2"5 The court concluded that, because of the restraint placed on the
offender, the effect that notification has on rehabilitation, and because the statute
served "the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence," it has
the effect of punishing sex offenders.246 The court's final conclusion was that
"the legislative intent, the design of the Act, the historical treatment of
comparable measures, and the Act's effects provide the 'clearest proof that the
notification provisions of the Act are punitive in nature.""4
D. An Intent-Effects Test: Russell v. Gregoire"'
The most recent case using the principled approach to examine "Megan's
Law" comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In
Russell v. Gregoire, two convicted sex offenders were ordered to register and
notify under Washington's version of "Megan's Law. 249 The plaintiffs had
236. Id. at 624.
237. Id. at 625.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 626.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 627.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 628 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. at 567-68).
247. Id. at 629.
248. 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
249. Id. at 1081; see Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.130(I) (West Supp. 1998).
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been convicted in 1989 and the statute in question was enacted in 1990."
Therefore, they brought a civil rights action against various state officials
claiming that the registration and notification provisions of the Act, inter alia,
violated the ex post facto clause of the Federal Constitution. 5 '
The Russell decision is helpful in developing a principled approach in
Louisiana for two reasons. First, it is the most recent pronouncement on this
issue and, therefore, has the benefit of some of the Supreme Court latest
interpretations on the punishment issue. Second, as an analysis of Washington's
version of "Megan's Law," it has important persuasive authority because
Louisiana's sex offender legislation is modeled after Washington's. Indeed,
Louisiana's legislation even adopts "the Washington Acts' findings and
information release provision, almost verbatim., 252
The court first noted that neither they nor the Supreme Court had developed
a clear test to determine what constitutes punishment under the ex post facto
clause." Next, the court recounted the Kennedy test saying that it is helpful
at analyzing the issue, but certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive." 4 The
test the court did find applicable was the one articulated in two recent Supreme
Court decisions, United States v. Ursery"5 and Kansas v. Hendricks." ' In
Ursery, the Supreme Court held that "civil forfeitures ... do not constitute
'punishment' for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause" even when the value
of the property forfeited is excessive when compared to the harm suffered by the
government from the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture.2" Hendricks
involved a Kansas statute that provided for the civil commitment of "sexually
violent predators."2 Under the statute, a person convicted or charged with a
violent sexual offense and suffering from a "mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence," could be confined to state custody until the person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder no longer made him dangerous to the
public.2 5
9
Russell described the Ursery-Hendricks test as an "intent-effects" analy-
sis. 60 The "intent" prong of the test looks to the stated legislative goal as well
250. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1081.
251. Id. at 1082.
252. Michelle P. Jerusalem, A Framework for Post Sentence Sex Offender Legislation:
Perspectives on Prevention, Registration. and the Public's "'Right" to Know, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 219
n.69 (1995).
253. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1084.
254. Id. at 1084 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980)).
255. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
256. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
257. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2147 (1996).
258. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct at 2076. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 to 59-29a15 (1994).
259. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct at 2077; Kan. Slat. Ann. § 59-29a01, § 59-29a02(a), § 59-29a07(a)
(1994).
260. 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (1997).
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as the structure and design of the statute. 26 . The "effects" prong requires the
challenging party to provide the "the clearest proof' that the statute is so punitive
in effect that it negates the State's nonpunitive intent.262 The court also
revived the Kennedy factors saying that, while it should not be the only inquiry,
they should be examined in assessing the effects of the act.263
Applying this to the Washington statute, the court noted that the stated
legislative purpose, as declared in the act itself, was clearly non-punitive.264
The court found the statement evidence of "unequivocal regulatory motiva-
tion."26  Regarding the notification provision, the court said that "[t]he
language of section 116 makes clear that the legislature intended the notification
provision to prevent future attacks by recidivist sex offenders." Even though law
may have a deterrent as well as a remedial purpose,2" "In]either of these
purposes would result in an ex post facto violation." 6 7 Additionally, the court
noted that the act contained sufficient protection to "prevent notification in cases
where it is not warranted and to avoid dissemination of the information beyond
the area where it is likely to have the intended remedial effect."216 As far as
the registration provision was concerned, the court believed that the legislative
intent was clearly regulatory stating, "[r]egistration does no more than apprise
261. Id. at 1087.
262. Id. at 1088.
263. Id. at 1084.
264. Id. at 1087. The legislature finds that sex offenders pose a high risk of engaging in sex
offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public
from sex offenders is a paramount governmental interest. The legislature further finds that the penal
and mental health components of our justice system are largely hidden from public view and that lack
of information from either may result in failure of both systems to meet this paramount concern of
public safety. Overly restrictive confidentiality and liability laws governing the release of
information about sexual predators have reduced willingness to release information that could be
appropriately released under the public disclosure laws, and have increased risks to public safety.
Persons found to have committed a sex offense have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the
public's interest in public safety and in the effective operation of government. Release of
information about sexual predators to public agencies and under limited circumstances, the general
public, will further the governmental interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal and
mental health systems so long as the information released is rationally related to the furtherance of
those goals. Therefore, this state's policy as expressed in Section 117 of this act is to require the
exchange of relevant information about sexual predators among public agencies and officials and to
authorize the release of necessary and relevant information about sexual predators to members of the
general public. 1990 Wash. Laws, ch. 3, § 116.
265. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing State v. Ward, 869 P.2d
1062, 1068 (Wash. 1994)).
266. "Although registration arguably has a deterrent effect, Ursery declared that deterrence can
serve both civil and criminal goals. Ursery also noted that the fact that a sanction may be tied to
criminal activity alone is insufficient to render the sanction punitive." Id. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
at 2082.
267. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1090.
268. Id.
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law enforcement officials of certain basic information about an offender living
in the area."26'
Regarding the "effects" prong, the court discounted the plaintiff's argument
that the statute was punitive because failure to register could invoke additional
penalties. 7 0 The court said that
The fact that a prior conviction for sexual misconduct is an element of
the "failure to register" offense is of no consequence. It is hombook
law that no ex post facto problem occurs when the legislature creates a
new offense that includes a prior conviction as an element of the
offense, as long as the other relevant conduct took place after the law
was passed. 72
For this additional sanction, the conduct is the failure to register,.not the initial
conviction of the sex offense.
272
The court also examined the historical nature of notification and registration
as part of the effects prong." According to the court, a historical analysis is
not dispositive in making a "punishment" determination. 7' The best that this
approach can do is try and "draw an analogy between the Act and the punish-
ments of yesteryear."275 In any case, the court said that "[h]istorical shaming
punishments like whipping, pillory, and branding generally required the physical
participation of the offender, and typically required a direct confrontation
between the offender and members of the public." ' The court then quoted
the Verniero court for the proposition that "[p]ublic shaming, humiliation and
banishment all involve more than the dissemination of information.... 7
The court concluded that potential "ostracism and opprobrium" may result from
notification, but "humiliation alone does not constitute punishment. A law
imposing punishment has other ingredients-most importantly, an intent to
punish. 27
8
In Russell, the court made a point of distinguishing itself from Artway and
Verneiro.2 7 9 However, it is unclear in what ways the analysis differs. Argu-
269. Id. at 1087.
270. Id. at 1088.
271. Id. at 1088-89. See also United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997).
272. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1084.
273. Id. at 1091.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing EB v. Verniero 119 F.3d 1077, 1099-1100 (3d Cir. 1997)).
278. Id. at 1092 (citing Doe v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199. 1217 (D.N.J. 1996)).
279. Id. at 1084 n.5. The court stated that "[pirior to Ursery, the Third Circuit formulated a test
for punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause in Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81
F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir. 1996) based largely on the Halper-Austin-Kurth Ranch trio of cases. Artway
involved an ex postfacto challenge to New Jersey's 'Megan's Law,' which provided for registration
and community notification for certain convicted sex offenders. Because the Supreme Court in
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ably, the Russell court did not examine the objective purpose because it did not
explicitly state it as a separate factor. However, it appears that the court looked
at the legislative intent as including an objective element. In any case, the two
tests appear very similar. The real difference is probably that the stated
legislative purpose is given more deference in Russell than in ether Artway,
Verneiro, or Pataki since Russell requires "clear proof' by the plaintiff to
overcome the presumption that the stated non-punitive purpose is incorrect.
Nonetheless, these cases make it clear that when "Megan's Law" is challenged
as a violation of the ex post facto clause, each court must examine the specific
provision and determine if it is "punishment" and, therefore, even subject to the
clause. To sufficiently comply with an act of the legislature, it is important for
the courts to apply the law as written, providing its application remains within
constitutional limitations.
E. Principled Approach
As is evident in the previous section, the majority view is to examine certain
factors when making a "punishment" determination.28 ° This "principled
approach" has an advantage over the "intuitive approach" applied by Louisiana
courts because it provides concrete factors that a court can apply when the
nature of a statute is in question. These factors are: 1) the subjective legislative
intent; 2) the objective legislative intent; 3) the design of the statute; 4) whether
the sanction has historically been considered punishment; and 5) whether the
effects of the statute are disproportionate to its non-punitive aim.
This type of approach also accounts for the different notification and
registration statutes' requirements that a particular state may adopt. It allows a
court to particularize any state's version of "Megan's Law" and still maintain
analytical consistency. The language of a statute is important, and this type of
approach will help to factor in the punitive nature of each individual sanction.
V. WHY LOUISIANA SHOULD ADOPT A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
As noted earlier, Louisiana courts have not attempted to make a "punish-
ment" determination when interpreting "Megan's Law." Instead, it appears that
our state courts have assumed that the ex post facto clause applies to the statute
and may, in effect, be giving the statute a more narrow reading than is
necessary. 2 ' However, Louisiana courts have applied this analysis in a
distinct, but related, area. In State v. Johnson,282 the Supreme Court was asked
to determine whether a civil forfeiture made in accordance with the state's drug
Ursery has cast doubt on the application of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch in this context, we
decline to adopt Artway's test for punishment"
280. See supra text accompanying notes 157-275.
281. See supra authority in note 18.
282. 667 So. 2d 510 (La. 1996).
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"seizure statute violated the double jeopardy clause of either the state or the
federal constitution." 3 The court used HalperlAustin principles in determining
whether the statute was punitive or regulatory s2 4
In Johnson, the court framed the issue by stating that when "analyzing a case
to determine whether [the double jeopardy clause] has been violated, it is
necessary to resolve whether the particular sanction imposed upon a person for
the same conduct constitutes 'punishment' for this purpose." ' The court said
that the precepts applicable to this test could be found in )falper, Austin, and
Kurth Ranch."" After reviewing these cases, the court said the test was
whether
(1) thie sanction imposed is overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
damages the offender has caused and (2) the sanction bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the government for the costs it has
incurred in investigating and prosecuting the violation. However,...
to the extent that a remedial purpose is served, the civil sanction does
not constitute "punishment" within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause, unless the sanction is in effect so disproportionate to the
government's losses that it can be explained only as serving deterrent
or retributive purposes. 217
As one can see, this test is very similar to those described in the previous
section. Even though Johnson can be distinguished because the court was
interpreting the double jeopardy and not the ex post facto clause, this test could
easily be used in analyzing "Megan's Law." In fact, some cases indicate that
double jeopardy "punishment" is no different than ex post facto "punishment"
and that Johnson is not only relevant when interpreting "Megan's law," but
binding on the lower courts."8 Under this interpretation there is a clear
inconsistency between the state supreme court's handling of the punishment issue
and the way "Megan's Law" has been handled by the lower courts thus far. This
inconsistency, coupled with the fact that Louisiana now stands alone as the only
state that does not apply a multi-factored analysis when interpreting "Megan's
283. Id. at 511.
284. Id. at 514-16.
285. Id. at 514.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 518.
288. See generally Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1344 (1990). For the
proposition that double jeopardy "punishment" is the same as expostfacto "punishment," see United
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994), where the Ninth Circuit
held that punishment means punishment no matter which clause is involved, specifically holding that
Austin's finding of "punishment" in the excessive fines context fully applied to the same sanction in
the double jeopardy context; see also United States v. Certain Funds at Hong Kong, Shanghai Bank,
96 F.3d 20, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1996), where the Second Circuit held that its analysis was "equally
applicable" to the issue in the context of the ex post facto clause.
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Law," shows why the courts should reevaluate the statute by applying a
"principled approach."
Whether the use of such a principled approach will change the result is
debatable. As the earlier cases indicate, the multi-factor approach depends a
great deal on the wording of the statute. Also, as Pataki illustrates, it is not
unreasonable for a court to decide, based on these multiple factors, that "Megan's
Law" is punishment. 5 9 However, even if the multiple factor analysis would
achieve the same result as the current jurisprudence, it is still very important to
reexamine the issue, even if only to correct the inconsistency with Johnson. The
state supreme court has clearly authorized the use of a principled approach in the
double jeopardy context. 29° By not clarifying the interpretation of "Megan's
Law," the court leaves room for the argument that the state's ex post facto clause
encompasses laws that are not punitive. The court should take the first chance
to rectify this disparity so that it does not cause a problem in another context.
How should Louisiana's test look? In addition to the Johnson test, an
appropriate model for Louisiana to apply would be the Russell test applied by the
United States Ninth Circuit. The Russell test is important because it is the most
current analysis of "Megan's Law" by any United States Court of Appeals.
Therefore, it takes into account recent Supreme Court cases such as Ursery9 '
and Hendricki2 that contain the Court's latest statements on the "punishment"
issue. 93 Another reason the Russell analysis is relevant is that the statute at
issue is very similar to our statute. This is evidenced by Louisiana's adoption
of the Washington Act's findings and information release provision almost
verbatim. 94 Also, "Louisiana seems to have adopted a pubiic notification
provision based solely on the Washington model. The Washington and
Louisiana provisions for the release of information to the public are
practically identical." 2"
289. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
290. State v. Johnson, 667 So. 2d 510 (La. 1996).
291. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
292. Kansas v. Hendricks, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1997).
293. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997).
294. La. R.S. 15:540 (Supp. 1998).
295. For example, both provisions state that law enforcement agencies "are authorized to release
relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the
information is necessary for public protection." La. R.S. 15:546(A) (Supp. 1998); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 4.24.550(l) (West Supp. 1998). Both provide immunity for elected public officials, public
employees, and law enforcement agencies for "discretionary decision[s] to release relevant and
necessary information," unless that person "acted with gross negligence or in bad faith." La. R.S.
15:546(B) (Supp. 1998); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.550(2) (West Supp. 1998). Both authorize
immunity for the release of information regarding: (I) a person convicted of a sex offense; (2) a
person found not guilty of a sex offense by reason of insanity; and (3) a person found incompetent
to stand trial for a sex offense and subsequently committed. La. R.S. 15:546(B) (Supp. 1998); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.550(3) (West Supp. 1998). Finally, both provisions state that nothing in the
provision "shall impose any liability upon a public official, public employee, for law enforcement
agency] for failing to release information as provided" in the provision. La. R.S. 15:546(C) (Supp.
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Should a state court undertake an application of a multi-factored test as this
paper suggests, it will have to distinguish the ex post facto provision under the
state constitution from its federal counterpart. If the ex post facto clause
contained in the Louisiana Constitution is given the same interpretation as the
Federal Constitution then the Russell or Johnson test should apply. However,
since a state can provide more protection through its constitution than is provided
by the Federal Constitution, it is conceivable that the courts could interpret
Louisiana's ex post facto provision as not strictly limited to "punishment." 2
State v. Loyd 91 is the Louisiana Supreme Court's most recent interpreta-
tion of the state ex post facto provision. In Loyd, the defendant was found guilty
of murder and sentenced to death.29' However, during the pendency of the
penalty phase of the trial, the legislature enacted Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure article 905.2(B) which required the judge to instruct the jury that
commutation was available." Loyd complained that the use of the instruction
violated the ex post facto clause of both the state and Federal Constitutions.3"
The court dismissed the federal constitutional argument stating that United
States Supreme Court decisions such as Collins and Morales hold that "retrospec-
tive measures which only have an attenuated relationship with an increase in the
severity of punishment are not ex post facto laws." '' The court noted that
Collins illustrated a change in the Supreme Court's ex post facto jurispru-
dence3. stating that Collins "narrowed the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause's
application and returned to the traditional understanding of the Ex Post Facto
Clause as set forth in Calder v. Bull."3"3
Regarding the State Constitution, however, the court was more equivocal.
The court said the current law could be found in State ex rel. Glover.30'
Glover held that an ex post facto law is one passed "after the commission of an
offense which in relation to that offense or its punishment alters the situation of
a party to his disadvantage."30 5 The Loyd court said "to qualify under Glover
as an ex post facto law, the suspect legislation: (1) must be passed after the date
of the offense, (2) must relate to the offense or its punishment, and (3) must alter
1998); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.24.550(4) (West Supp. 1998). See also Michelle Pia Jerusalem,
Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention.
Registration. and the Public "Right" to Know, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 219 (1995).
296. See generally Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So. 2d
1094 (La. 1985).
297. 689 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1997).
298. Id. at 1323.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1326.
302. Id. at 1326.
303. Id. at 1324.
304. 660 So. 2d 1189, 1200 (La. 1995).
305. Id. at 1200.
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the situation of the accused to his disadvantage."" However, the Loyd court
did not say that this was the law. Instead they avoided having to overrule Glover
by stating: "[w]e have not yet addressed the question of whether, in light of
Collins, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Louisiana Constitution will be
interpreted to provide broader protection than that of the federal constitution...
[and] ... we do not need to decide that issue in this case."3°7
It is difficult to understand why the court refused to answer this question,
however, the answer may have come recently in State v. Johnson.. (discussed
above). When the Johnson court was asked to decide if the double jeopardy
clause of the state constitution was, like its federal counterpart, limited to
"punishment," they said that in light of "the language of these provisions and the
constitutional history of the state provision, we conclude that the drafters and
ratifiers of the state constitution did not intend for this court to define 'punish-
ment' for purposes of double jeopardy analysis any more broadly ... than
'punishment' has been construed by the United States Supreme Court ....'09
Whether this view can be used in the ex post facto context is debatable.
However, if punishment under the ex post facto clause is given the same
interpretation as it is under double jeopardy clause the court would really have
no choice but to interpret the clauses the same.3t
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of what to do with sex offenders after they have served their
sentences is one of which few are without opinion. It is an emotional issue
which pits the rights of defendants against the safety of children. Because of the
statistical data, it is not unreasonable for lawmakers to believe that these
criminals require special legislation to control their recidivist tendencies.
Whether sex offender legislation is appropriate, in the sense that it will be
effective in controlling these tendencies, is debatable. However, the enactment
of "Megan's law" shows that the legislature feels that these measures are proper
under the circumstances. For this reason, the courts should attempt to apply the
statute as the lawmakers intended unless that application would violate the
constitution. The problem is that Louisiana courts, in attempting to comply with
the state and federal constitutions, may have unduly limited the statute by
applying ex post facto principles.
The majority view in interpreting these statutes is to apply a "principled
approach" to determine if the statute is punitive in nature or merely regulatory.
However, Louisiana courts have failed to line themselves up with this majority
*when interpreting our version of "Megan's Law." Even if the result in Louisiana
306. Lloyd, 689 So. 2d at 1326.
307. Id.
308. 667 So. 2d 510 (La. 1996).
309. Id. at 513.
310. See generally Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, supra note 288.
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would be the same under a mutli-factor examination, it is important to interpret
"Megan's Law" under a principled approach to bring Louisiana in line with other
jurisdictions' interpretations of "Megan's Law" and make this state's jurispru-
dence on the punishment issue consistent.
Hilliard "Trey" Kelly

